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THE CATHOLIC MIND: CULTURE,
PHILOSOPHY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

WILLIAM A. FRANK
University of Dallas

This article ar-gues that any quest to establish or str-engthen Catholic identity in educational institutions is ultimately a question of philosophical foundations. The author discusses the impor'tance and fr-agility of culture as it
applies to Catholic thought and analyzes the philosophical components necessary for sustaining a dominant cultural ethos. The article concludes with
a tentative formulation of four responsibilities of professors in Catholic
institutions of higher learning.

E

ducators assume the task of transmitting and advancing key elements of
culture. Among these is a philosophical component that is essential to the
Catholic mind. It is of vital interest, therefore, for Catholic educators to maintain the lively presence of the philosophical component in the Catholic cast
of mind. The argument rests upon the twofold conviction that a culture is
more authentically human to the degree that it is influenced by openness to
the presence of transcendent truth and that this openness is a disposition that
must be actively cultivated.
The discussion begins with a reflection on the nature of culture. The ulterior goal is to increase our understanding of the aims and importance of education by indicating the cultural significance of a founding animus behind the
work of a university. The existential fragility of culture, addressed in the first
section of the essay, gives a mild note of urgency to the work of educators.
The second section explains what is meant by the philosophical component
that is essential to any authentic culture. It is characterized as a cast of mind
commonly evident in life's experience of wonder, love of truth, a concern for
purposes, or an interest in beauty. Generally, the capacity to distance oneself
from the immediacies of one's everyday concerns and professional tasks is
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essential to philosophy. This section also clarifies how this basic cast of mind
should be a fundamental concern of Catholic higher education. The conclusion considers four professional responsibilities that are ordered toward
transmitting and advancing this cast of mind through the work of teachers
and researchers in institutions of higher education.

MEANING AND FRAGILITY OF CULTURE
In the primary sense, culture exists as an active, living form of life in a community or society. It is the shared intelligibility that informs and directs a
community's inclinations and sensibilities. It is the network of attitudes
enlightening and disposing persons as they judge and act according to norms
of their community or society. It is experienced as a web of sentiments,
expectations, and anticipations that condition personal presence in the world.
Culture establishes the practical realm of what is possible and acceptable in
human intercourse.
Personal life is negotiated in the categories of right and wrong, beautiful
and ugly, sensible and silly, comic and tragic, public and private, honest and
dishonest, gentle and coarse, banal and mysterious. These categories are first
made effective by being received in and molded by the affective processes of
human persons. The philosopher Buttiglione (1997) observes that "in the life
of a nation, literature, music, and art have precisely the task of forming the
social archetypes, of determining the modes in which the great values will be
inteiiorized and lived" (p. 360). The archetypes that Buttiglione discusses
mediate between the raw spiritual powers of the individual and the fundamental norms that govern the meaning of life. The creative thinkers, poets
and prophets of a people carry on this work of determining the modalities in
which the values and disvalues of a culture will be concretely interiorized.
One should not too exclusively identify a culture's creative agents with its
great artists, however, for much of culture originates in the discrimination
and poetry of the thoughts, sensibilities, and language of common people.
What is important to realize is that there is a particular language of the
spirit by which people engage one another and their environment. This language is culture. It alerts us to the salient values in life s many situations. It
lubricates our judgments and mobilizes our desires. Culture, in other words,
is somewhat like a prejudice and a habit. Through it, the basic truths of a
group instruct and direct desire.
The idea of culture employed here expresses several points emphasized
in a short essay by Maggiolini (1989), the bishop of Como in northern Italy.
He explains that "the human being, in the visible world, is the only actual
subject of culture' (p. 162). In other words, culture is primarily an attribute
not of things, buildings, books, or institutions, but of men and women. It
names the concrete manner in which they deploy their personal powers in
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their engagements in the worid. Second, he says that the human being is culture's "sole object and its end. Culture...is that by which the person is more
fully, attains a fuller measure of his being" (p. 162). In sum, "culture is the
person himself who expresses himself, thinks and acts, who creates certain
determined contexts of values and of behavior, and by these is helped or hindered in his efforts to become more fully what he should be" (p. 162).
Culture gives a concrete form to human life, but it is also important to
distinguish it from the determinisms of nature. For culture appears as man's
response to the fact that in his freedom he is expected to complete nature.
Human persons craft themselves in a way that is not true of wholly natural
entities. If the idea of the "natural man" is to have any validity then it must
be taken paradoxically. In its literal sense the expression is a distortion, a misleading figment of the imagination. Men and women are not wild. Wildness
is not an option for human beings, as though we did not need civilization, and
could choose to live outside of it. This is not to deny that there are universal
material conditions of human existence, certain generic biological and psycho-social necessities that are lived out in people of all times and places. But
such necessities are no more the substance of human experience than clay is
the essence of a funeral urn. The elements of human nature need to be exercised, and this actualization always assumes a specific, concrete form not
already determined in the givens of nature. For example, everywhere men
speak a language, they rear their children and worship their gods. Yet the
specifics of language, education, and religion reflect the unpredictable differences of human choice.
The leap from generic, universal, and material conditions to the concreteness of actual, historical life covers a profound gap. Although it may
look slight once the step is taken and we look backwards at the achievement,
the emergence of rational animals into history is a momentous happening.
History requires an infiux of a causality wholly unseen in nature. Choice
introduces something of another order. The craft and prudence that lift
mankind beyond what is given by nature spring from the spiritual resources
of human freedom and intelligence. Nature does not beget or preserve the
particulars of language, architecture, religion, cuisine, clothing, economics,
or politics. Creativity—some combination of willpower, prudence, and artistic genius—gives us the world and history of human experience.
Although it may be that history is the necessary realm for the discovery
of truth and the achievement of man's salvation, it does not follow that the
makers of history are not responsible to a truth and a good that transcend the
immanent dimension of history. The point is that the agents of a healthy,
vibrant culture make history with a regard for the transcendent truth. Among
the most important defining moments in a culture is its turn toward a transcendent reality. Historically this has happened in both philosophy and religion. The philosophical and the Christian mind suffuses all expressions of the
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human spirit with an interest in what lies beyond the immanence of all natural and historical reality. Socrates, for example, was inveterately an
Athenian and yet larger than Athens. More radically, Christ requires his followers to be in the world but not of it. A moment's reflection shows the paradoxical nature of such a culture. Because it is culture, it particularizes one's
personal capacities in the modality of a sensibility and intelligence that colors all thought, action, and production with the values of archetypal norms.
At the same time, its distinctive cast means that every cultural expression
must be critically judged in the light of transcendent ideals.
The idea that by its very nature any culture is a fragile reality introduces
a note of mild urgency. An anecdote reported by the English medievalist
Southern (1953) helps make the point. The main character in the story is
Fulbert of Chartres (960-1028), who was among the more learned men of his
day. His brilliance was instrumental in the emergence of the celebrated
School of Chartres as a major center of learning in the 11th and 12th centuries. The story goes like this. A learned man named Reginald from the
cathedral city of Cologne, in the course of his study of one of Boethius's
commentaries on Aristotle, was mystified by a passage that said that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. He did not know what
it meant, and in correspondence with an equally learned colleague in Liege,
had come no closer to the correct meaning. Reginald concocted some plausible, but incorrect, interpretation and mentions that "once when he had been
passing through Chartres he had taken the problem to Fulbert" (p. 202), who
after much discussion, had agreed to Reginald's faulty explanation. In effect,
a basic knowledge of Euclidean geometry was unknown to some of the
brightest scholars of the West. What is true of geometry and knowledge in
general holds for other elements of culture such as law and religion. What
takes generations to establish can be swiftly and profoundly lost.
The anecdote emphasizes the fragility of culture, which exists only in the
actuality of the spiritual powers sustained by the interior life. Scholars have
given much thought to the inventive genius that goes into altering and enlarging culture. Equal if not greater genius is required for the vigilance that maintains culture. Dumb inertia or sheer momentum carries no weight in the spiritual life. In the absence of active regard, particular elements of culture
descend to what St. Augustine would call the abyss of forgetfulness.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND CHRISTIAN MIND
AND THE UNIVERSITY
The institution of the university, which cultivates the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, is itself a historical artifact of culture. Its invention
was a response to the profusion of knowledge in the 12th and 13th centuries
and to the pressing practical need for young men of new learning to assume
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posts in an increasingly complex European society. The original universities
vastly exceeded the ambitions and achievements of the antecedent monastic
and cathedral schools that had carried the burden of higher education in the
Christian West for the previous 500 years or more. In his 1988 Gifford lectures. Maclntyre (1990) asked the question, "What are universities for?"
"What peculiar goods do universities serve?" (p. 222). He proposed in
response that "universities are places where conceptions of and standards of
rational justification are elaborated, put to work in the detailed practices of
enquiry, and themselves rationally elaborated, so that only from the university can the wider society learn how to conduct its own debates, practical or
theoretical, in a rationally defensible way" (p. 222).
Seven hundred years after their original founding, Maclntyre has pared
down their purpose to the barest nub. As he conceives it, universities are centers that foster debate over the very standards of rationality that society will
ultimately adopt. However, it seems that the possibility of such debate rests
upon a most important precondition. Within the cultural confines of the university inquiring minds are liberated from the received modes of inquiry and
standards of rationality. But such freedom is not simply given. This sort of
intellectual liberality is an intellectual or spiritual achievement that occurred
originally in the turn of Greek thinkers toward philosophy and was subsequently appropriated within theological inquiry. In due time, this critical spirit of intellectual freedom was institutionalized in the university. As a condition of its pursuit of knowledge, the university evolved as the principal bearer of the philosophical and theological spirit. In a significant measure,
European culture has conceived itself in the liberty that this critical reason
enjoys.
Neither philosophy nor Christianity is primarily a branch or division of
knowledge. They are more properly a defining animus. It is truer, for
instance, to say that one is philosophical than that one knows philosophy, that
one is Christian, than that one knows Christian things. In fact, knowledge
springs from a form of life. The propositions of knowledge, its facts and dogmas, are not passed on like discrete items to be fixed in the memory like
museum pieces. Rather, they are continually tended and increasingly interconnected in the critical spirit of mind that harbors them. The most essential
obligation of Catholic education is to nourish this critical spirit of mind and
to encourage the extension of its light into every field of research.
So what precisely is this decisive spirit of the mind? The basic truth about
human existence that continually informs authentic culture rests upon a distinction that has been variously described. It concerns the matter of love,
those objects that make a claim upon our passions, those interests that draw
forth our powers of intelligence, imagination, and will. Consider the case of
Socrates, who lived the latter part of his life in the conviction that the interest of politics, civic religion, economy, family, and friendship did not suffice
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the human spirit. Even the optimum portion of pleasure, health, wealth, and
honor would leave a person like himself wanting. "What is more?" Common
Sense might ask. "Truth and wisdom," the Philosopher would answer. As
Socrates put in the Apology, the unexamined life is not worth living. The
examination Socrates has in mind requires a measure of withdrawal from the
passions that tie us to the ordinary loves of our life. The logical space created in this withdrawal encompasses two realities: the self's interiority and
glimmerings of transcendent truth. Included are the basic discoveries of the
notion of the human person and the source of its incomparable dignity, which
become moral axes in classical thought. Socrates was not an idealist who
scorned a nugatory worldly existence. For one reason, he had too fine a sense
of humor. Moreover, he enjoyed his particular friendships and maintained a
grudging piety for the city of his own and his children's birth. Nevertheless,
it is true that all of his worldly enjoyments were tinged with the gall of a spirit left wanting. By his practice of philosophic inquiry, Socrates acquired a
language of the spirit that "bid the soul to gather itself together by itself
(Phaedo, 83a-b). This personal solitude gives to men or women the standpoint from which to wonder critically about the truth of their worldly commitments. Two and a half millennia later, Maritain, in his Person and the
Common Good (1947), continues the same insight when writing that the
metaphysical tradition of the West defines the person in terms of independence, as a reality which, subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe unto
itself, a relatively independent whole within the great whole of the universe,
facing the transcendent whole which is God (p. 30).
Philosophy, however, and least of all metaphysics, is not the way that
Everyman will acquire the critical language of the spirit. And yet, subsequent
to its original discovery and entry into culture, many men and women will
acquire this critical spirit. Thomas Aquinas soberly describes the limitations
of philosophy in the first article of his Summa Theologiae I, Question 1,
Article I: "The truth about God, such as reason can know it, would only be
known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the mixture of many
errors." In other words, it is thanks to religious faith and not philosophical
tutelage that Everyman is able to measure or check his worldly attachments
by an overarching love for truth.
Christianity not only democratized certain key philosophical teachings, it
enhanced them. Of particular importance for our purposes is the notion of
original sin or the personal capacity for self-will or egoism. Let us appeal to
Augustine of Hippo to draw out the main point, since few have spoken about
sin with such clear philosophical insight as did he. In his view, every human
person struggles with the conflict between the tendency to will what he loves
into the truth and the opposing inchnation to will to love what is the tmth.
Augustine's moral realism illustrates his belief that every man begins his
moral experience subordinating or instrumentalizing his sense of the truth to
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the interests of self-will. Christian life reverses the order of the loves. The
theological virtues concretely restructure a person's affective responses, sensibilities, and dispositions so that they refiect the subordination of one's personal powers to the claims of the God of revelation. It is important to understand that docility to the transcendent truth—whether through philosophy or
revelation—rests upon the freedom that struggles to love the truth alongside
competing partial loves. The innate contrariety at the center of the human
heart keeps one's personal orientation to transcendent values permanently in
jeopardy.
Yet when the critical spirit of philosophy and Christianity becomes part
of one's mentality it is interesting to note the profound spiritual ambiguity
that conditions experience. At issue is the question of whether one's concern
with the immanent realms of existence—politics, economics, family, friendship—sufficiently answers to the deepest desires of the human person. If it
does not, as the classical tradition holds, then the human spirit qualifies its
worldly interests and loyalties. From the political point of view, for instance,
Socratic wisdom divided Athens. Wisdom often confiicts with the pieties that
secure cities. St. Augustine took a dark view of ancient Greek and Roman
civilization. Gibbon (1932) blamed the fall of the great Roman Empire on the
essentially uncivil Christian religion. On the personal side, Augustine spoke
of the universal, unavoidable desire for truth and wisdom, but at the same
time, saw that the inevitable response to its call is to try to hide it from oneself. Truth makes difficult demands upon personal being. Because the human
heart suffers a profound contrariety at its core, the self's existential interests
conflict with its essential teleology. Human life, in its individual and corporate forms, plays out the confiict between power under the sway of self-will
and power subordinating itself to a transcendent truth. In favor of truth's
cause lies the intrinsic beauty of truth itself and mankind's innate, even if
inconstant, susceptibility to its allure. In fact, the deepest human liberation
flows from the self's subordination of itself to truth. But this cannot be seen
from the other side of the experience, while one still tries to condition all
objects of one's interest by the immanent determinations of human will. Prior
to the penetration of truth into the core of the self, freedom suggests itself as
the accumulated power of self-will, as self-commanding autonomy.
Whether one thinks of it in terms of the philosophic attitude of Socrates
or the conversion of heart in Christianity, philosophy and faith exist in men
and women to the degree that they penetrate their personal powers of imagination, intellect, and will. The attitudes and dispositions we are speaking of
here are instances of culture, as described in the first section. They condition
the passions, inclinations, and rational assessments that prompt one into
action. As with any culture, faith and philosophy have their lexicon and
grammar, their canon of stories, their dogmas, rituals or exemplars through
which they convey a distinctive attitude toward the world and other persons.
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The Catholic university has a special role to play in the maintenance, intensification, extension, and application of these fundamental attitudes.
Catholic universities are charged with the task of rational inquiry at the
highest level. The scope of this inquiry is universal, for as a corporate body
it is responsible for the integrated totality of knowledge. Its mode of inquiry
is broadly theoretical, which is to say that it pursues the basic distinctions and
foundational principles that justify particular knowledge in the various arts or
sciences. Christian faith is in no way alien to rational inquiry, since its very
substance is a love of the truth. This love sustains itself in the keen consciousness of a countervailing tendency to invest in the trappings of truth that
are nothing more than the outworkings of self-will. Imbued with this attitude,
the Christian thinker can be as critical as any Freudian, Marxist, or feminist
who would test all knowledge claims and norms for their self-serving biases.
Catholic rituals may differ from the particulars of a Druid or an Aztec
cult. But the expressions "Catholic knowledge" or "Christian science"—
except when they signify the understanding of Catholic or Christian things—
are confused terms. The Catholic intellectual harbors expert knowledge in a
Christian mind; and, as with any mentality, it influences his capacity for
insight and judgment. Sectarian practices do in fact fashion the spirit. They
are a practical necessity for acquiring the Christian faith. Why and how that
is so can itself become a question of inquiry to be taken up in the universities. With respect to the non-sectarian disciplines, however, the employment
of the Catholic mind is a public exercise in a worldly activity. Its evidences
and opinions are common property. Its truths dignify and enhance human life,
or it is not truth. The fact that universities were originally conceived in the
heart of the Church and have been sustained by the Christian churches almost
exclusively until the last century and a half suggests a particular congeniality between Christian faith and the work of inquiry conducted at the university level.
Catholic faith endorses the axiomatic philosophical conviction that the
intelligibility of reality is available to the human intellect. In addition to the
critical element found among the classical philosophers, Christian faith also
insists on divine transcendence and the corresponding limitation intrinsic to
the reach of human minds. But most of all, the Christian spirit preserves the
distinction upon which any critical inquiry is reared. I refer to the distinction
between truth and power. Truth is not a form of power; it is not a love, passion, inclination, drive, capacity, or potency. If truth holds sway, it is not by
virtue of any force that it exercises, but rather because some person has subordinated his will to its directive. An honest, strong, well-trained reason
catches glimmerings of truth, and its more ample and more certain teaching
speaks to those who have ears of faith. The greatest challenge to an authentic culture, therefore, is to cultivate in its people a spirit of attachment to and
hospitality for the truth. To the extent that this is done, then respect for the
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dignity of human persons and regard for the natural law will inform the
actions and institutions that make up the world we live in. In this way, a countervailing force whose only cause is the disinterested love of truth will meet
the inevitable forces of egoistic self-will. It is naive to think that the forces of
self-will will not often have their way. But we can reasonably hope for a culture in which the human spirit does not altogether spend itself in an unmeasured pursuit of self-interest, whether it takes the way of the hollow sensualism of the consumer society or that of totalitarianism's cruel brutality.
Men and women disposed to measure the employment of their personal
powers under the authority of transcendent truth have their role to play in all
areas of professional life: the marketplace, the courts, the churches, governmental bureaus, research laboratories, media studios, and the halls of academia. Since the founding of the universities, however, progress in all these distinct spheres of work has been increasingly promoted by the knowledge and
cultivated habits of the academic mind.
Since its founding some 700 years ago, the institution of the university is
distinguished by its twofold mission of research and teaching. Society needs
the knowledge and habits of minds cultivated in the ethos of a university.
Toward this end, sponsoring societies have been remarkably indulgent with
the university. They have granted university communities a large measure of
self-governance and endowed its professors and students with leisure. These
political and material allowances acknowledge the fact that the kind of
knowledge needed to sustain a liberal society originates in an atmosphere of
self-criticism, in thought that assumes a practical distance from the necessary,
pressing, and partial interests that dominate political and economic activity.
However, the personal attitude that refuses to spend itself in the pursuit of the
partial and individualistic goods of pleasure, wealth, honor, and power, a disposition of the spirit that we earlier called Socratic or philosophical, does not
belong exclusively to university professors and their students. Even less is
the Christian faith the special prerogative of intellectuals. These basic conditions of the spirit belong to the general culture of a people, and are frequently instanced in men and women across all walks of life. The distinction of the
university community lies not in its spiritual elitism, its keener sense of truth
or justice. It is not likely that on average purer characters are to be found
among university professors than among housewives, clergy, military officers, businessmen, or school teachers.
One should not overstate the autonomy of the university. It is not a complete community. It is porous with respect to the larger community. Most
obviously, its students regularly pass from larger society and move back into
it, carrying with them the legitimate desire for shouldering the responsibilities of practical, worldly affairs. Second, the chartering mandate of the university rests upon the authority of a spiritual tradition over which the university community has no proprietary claim. The desire for wisdom and truth is
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nourished in the traditions kept alive in the culture of the larger society, most
especially in its religion, public art, and system of laws. To imagine the university as an ideal community governed by academic judgment worthy of
being extended to the broader society is a form of madness. Modern disasters
with Utopian thinking should have cured us of such fancies. Theology should
not govern religion. It is wrong to imagine that philosophic inquiry aims to
replace common sense and professional judgment. No amount of theoretical
understanding of law will yield the jurisprudence of a good judge. University
research strengthens, even purifies, extramural professional judgment, but it
cannot substitute for it. Paradoxically, it is often the wise among practical
folk who estimate best the worth of the university. They keenly feel the limits of their understanding of the tradition they draw upon in exercising their
practical and professional judgment. They are aware of how one's measure of
common sense and prudence runs dry as the variety and sheer quantity of
work increase. The regulative norms and principles of a discipline or a profession require ongoing critical examination, which is a decisive task of the
university.
Recall the earlier claim that an authentic culture cultivates the lure of
transcendent truth and wisdom. It fosters an openness to them in the affective
and dynamic potentialities of a people. The university is responsible for an
essential step in the mediation of the transcendent ideals of truth and wisdom
to the basic spiritual dispositions and attitudes that give rise to personal
action. University research and teaching provide, at the level of principle,
rational clarity and order for the disciplines. The university is constituted as
a professional community of thinkers who attend to the presence and absence
of transcendent truth in the manifold arts and sciences. Insofar as the Catholic
faith jealously guards the truth from falsification at the hands of self-will, it
is especially suited as an animating spirit in the field of knowledge.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR
Since it is the culture of the university faculty that keeps the animating spirit of philosophy and Christian faith alive in the day-to-day working of university life, let me conclude with a discussion of four areas where individual
university professors bear the weight of responsibility for sustaining this specific culture.

RESEARCH
The intensification and extension of one's understanding of reality is the most
essential work of the university professor. The first responsibility is to the
truth. To mitigate the apparent sententiousness of the claim, one need only
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recall the measure of frivolous willfulness and special interests that too often
determine the path of inquiry. Aristophanes laughed at it in the Clouds and
Jonathan Swift satirized it in Gulliver's account of his visit to the Academy
of Lagado. Behind the laughter is the spectacle of spiritual waste and hovering disaster. The employment of spiritual powers for understanding,
unhinged from truth's authority, especially in our contemporary culture so
dependent upon bureaucracy and technology, will lead to the impoverishment
of culture. Although, as we said previously, authentic culture is not dependent
upon the university for the authoritative presence of the truth, it does depend
upon it to extend this authority into the pursuit of knowledge at its highest
level. In addition to the authority of his or her discipline, the professor in a
Catholic university is responsible to the authority of the Catholic faith.
Again, faith does not here refer to an invisible mark, an inexpressible feeling
or an otherworldly revelation. It is a conversion of heart that sustains itself in
a panoply of dispositions, sensibilities, and attitudes expressed in the tradition of its literature, practices, and institutions. It is the responsibility of the
Catholic university professor to appropriate the elements of this faith in the
pursuit of knowledge.

DIGNITY OF STUDENTS
The act of education rests upon an ethical transaction between the teacher and
the student. As the Congregation for Catholic Education (1998) put it,
"Teaching has an extraordinary moral depth and is one of man's most excellent and creative activities, for the teacher does not write on inanimate material, but on the very spirits of human beings" (#19). Learning requires on the
part of the student a measure of good will and acceptance of the teacher's
authority. In the act of yielding to authority a person exposes himself to being
instrumentalized. It is possible that what promises to be the genuine authority of truth might only be the sophisticated force of another person's self-interest. Generally, I think this ethical transaction between the student and the
teacher is governed by the judgment that the trust given by the student will
be met with corresponding responsibility on the part of the teacher. In such a
compact the teacher commits himself to respect the student's capacity to
stand independently in personal freedom before the truth. He also assumes
the range of duties, such as preparing courses, grading papers, holding office
hours, and writing recommendations, which are practically required if the
student is to acquire the skills and virtues and to enjoy the opportunities necessary to attain professional competence. The university professor therefore
carries, in the second place, the responsibility of directly influencing youth
precisely at the stage of their lives when they enter into the larger culture as
fresh bearers of critical knowledge and as the promise of its future.
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PROFESSIONAL TEMPERAMENT
The third responsibility is to maintain one's professional temperament. Just
as athletes need to keep in training and maintain their focus, so it is in the
academic life. The professor's rational powers need to move comfortably,
with a kind of "athletic ease," in the logical space liberated from the tracks
of reason determined by the pressing interests of political, economic, and personal life. One's personal style as a teacher or writer may be dogmatic or
evocative, systematic or diffuse, cool or frenzied; it makes no difference. But
it is essential to have a rational and critical intellectual approach tethered to
interest in the truth of things. To maintain the essential elements of the philosophical and Christian mind in the ongoing mastery of one's discipline
requires self-conscious effort.
It is useful to emphasize two marks of Catholic intellectual temperament.
The first is a sense of wonder. Insofar as the desire that motivates inquiry is
released from the anxious interests of self-will it becomes possible to be
involved in the truth of things and to enjoy a pure delight in the beauty of
reality. This mindset of leisure is the one spoken of so eloquently by Pieper
(1963) at a time in the 20th century when anxious self-will was bent on
silencing every reference to a transcendent truth. Among the signs of an abiding attitude of leisure is the presence of irony, gratitude, joyfulness, and penitence. These qualities enrich our understanding of reality and human things,
for they allow us to see that things and personal actions have significance
beyond the immediate interests of our selves or societies. The second mark is
moral realism. The Catholic mind is acutely attuned to the self's tendency to
will into truth the objects of its own unmeasured loves. It has learned to identify displays of power unchecked by truth. Regardless of how awful evil is,
the Catholic mind is not surprised at its persistent presence in human affairs.
Nor is it either blind to or ungrateful for the remarkable perdurability of good
in the world. This moral realism protects one from the temptations toward
utopianism, nihilistic pessimism, and integralism.

CIVIC PIETY
Finally, university professors have the responsibility to maintain the pieties
of their larger communities. What properly happens in the university draws
upon spiritual resources more properly secured in the common life and by the
authorities of society at large. Moreover, academic achievements directly
influence the broader culture of a society. Consequently, professors have a
responsibility to remain in solidarity with the concems and loves of their
larger, supporting communities. In the absence of such extra-academic bonds,
the professor loses touch with the vivifying sources and larger purposes of his
work. From a purely practical point of view, civic piety is a useful antidote to
the hubris of an effective or Utopian rationalism that is an occupational haz-
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ard of academicians. More essentially, personal engagement in the fuller concerns of human life extends the range of reason necessary to inquire after the
elusive reality of what some have called the permanent things. In a Catholic
university, this civic piety is extended to the estate of the Church and especially to the sources of its authoritative revelation.
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